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HAS PRECEDENT EVER REALLY MATTERED IN
THE SUPREME COURT?
Frederick Schauer*
INTRODUCTION
The doctrine of precedent is in the news. In the last year, and
especially from the close of the Supreme Court's 2006 Term to the
present, various academic, quasi-academic, and non-academic com-
mentators have been criticizing the Roberts Court for disregarding
precedent.' For these commentators, the Roberts Court has abdicated
its duty as a court to treat its earlier decisions with something close
to conclusive respect, and to do so regardless of the views of the
current Justices about the wisdom of those earlier decisions.2
Although the Supreme Court of the United States claims to follow
* Frank Stanton Professor of the First Amendment, John F. Kennedy School of Government,
Harvard University, and George Eastman Professor (2007-2008) and Fellow of Balliol College, Oxford
University. This Article is the written version of the 41st Henry J. Miller Lecture, delivered at the
Georgia State University College of Law on September 10, 2007. 1 am grateful to Henry Monaghan,
Carol Steiker, Matthew Stephenson, William Stuntz, Laurence Tribe, Mark Tushnet, and Lloyd Weinreb
for references to cases and secondary literature, to the faculty at Georgia State University for their
probing questions, to Bill Edmundson for an extremely helpful written commentary, and to Bobbie
Spellman for useful discussion about the concept of precedent and its relation to human thinking,
reasoning, and decision-making.
1. The intense commentary has been, in part, fueled by the Court's own explicit attention to the
issue. See, e.g., Fed. Election Comm'n v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2652, 2704 (2007) (Souter,
J., dissenting) (stating that the Court suffers when "important precedent is overturned without good
reason"); Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2705, 2737 (2007) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that no new or changed conditions existed to justify overturning longstanding
precedent); Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618, 2649 (2007) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (objecting to
majority's disregard of relevant precedent); Scott v. Harris, 127 S. Ct. 1769, 1781 (2007) (Breyer, J.,
concurring) (concluding that stare decisis concerns are weakest when a rule concerns only judges and
when there has been little reliance); Randall v. Sorrell, 126 S. Ct. 2479, 2503 (2006) (Thomas, J.,
concurring) (the "court has never felt constrained to follow precedent" when based on "unworkable or [
badly reasoned" decisions (quoting Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827)).
2. For a prominent example, see Editorial, Justice Denied, N.Y. TIMES, July 5, 2007, at 12. See also
Ronald Dworkin, The Supreme Court Phalanx, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Sept. 27, 2007, at 92; Charles Lane,
Narrow Victories Move Roberts Court to Right; Decisions Ignore Precedent, Liberal Justices Contend,
WASH. POST, June 29, 2007, at A4; Dorothy Samuels, Reflections on the New Abortion Ruling and the
Roberts Court, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 27, 2007, at 26; Geoffrey R. Stone, Our Faith-Based Justices, CHI.
TRIB., Apr. 30, 2007, at 19.
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precedent,3 and although the Justices write their opinions as if they
were following precedent, 4 the Supreme Court's supposed obligation
to follow precedent has not traditionally been treated by com-
mentators-academic and non-academic alike-as something to be
taken very seriously.5 And insofar as the public cares what the
Supreme Court does, itself a debatable proposition,6 the public seems
largely unaware of the idea of precedent, and seems equally uncon-
cerned with whether the Supreme Court follows it or not. When the
public agrees with the Court's outcomes, it appears to have little
interest in how the Court got there, and when the public disagrees
with those outcomes, it becomes no more interested in questions of
methodology. Indeed, much the same can be said about elected
officials, who, as Michael Dukakis discovered to his detriment in
71988, seldom receive any political credit for following precedent or
praising those who do, at least if the precedent is in support of an
otherwise unpopular substantive outcome or policy. At the same
time, public officials are equally seldom subject to criticism for
disregarding judicial precedent in the service of politically popular
policies.8 For politicians and the public, following a precedent just
because of its status as a precedent seems hardly to matter at all.
3. See Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738, 2766, 2800,
2835 (2007), the most recent of countless Supreme Court cases in which both the majority and
dissenting opinions claimed explicitly to rely on precedent while accusing the other side of disregarding
it.
4. Indeed, this is often most apparent in those cases in which even patent departures from precedent
are written as if they were based on the very precedents that are being essentially overruled. E.g.,
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 450 (1969) (per curiam).
5. See Henry P. Monaghan, Taking Supreme Court Opinions Seriously, 39 MD. L. REV. 1, 1 (1979).
6. See Frederick Schauer, Foreword: The Court's Agenda - and the Nation's, 120 HARV. L. REV. 4,
21(2006).
7. When asked during the 1988 Presidential campaign why, as Governor of Massachusetts, he had
vetoed a bill requiring public school teachers to say the Pledge of Allegiance in class, Dukakis
responded that the existing case law mandated his veto, a response widely taken at the time to be a
significant political gaffe. See Frederick Schauer, Ambivalence About the Law, 49 ARIZ. L. REV. 11, 26
(2007).
8. A good example comes from the Flag Protection Act of 1989, passed overwhelmingly by
Congress almost immediately after the Supreme Court's decision in Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 420
(1989), invalidating state flag desecration laws. Given the decision in Johnson, it came as no surprise
when the Flag Protection Act was invalidated by the Court in United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310,
318-19 (1990). Foreshadowing what is to come in this article, it is worth noting that Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor, White, and Stevens, all of whom dissented in Johnson, persisted in
[Vol. 24:381
HeinOnline -- 24 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 382 2007-2008
382  I    l.  
t,3    
4  
  
ade ic i    
  
  6  
   
 
 
 
,  f 
l y_ , t  
  
,    
t  
  
ti ,       
 i l t  l   
 t  
 t  
ents  . . . lli   ist. .1,   
 ,           
    t r i  
. 
,  ent 
are ritte  s if t  r  s   t  r  r t  t t r  i  ti ll  rr l . . ., 
r urg . i ,  . . ,  ( ) ( r ri ). 
, i  rt i s l , .  v I, I ). 
.  i  , e ord:  rt's    i 's,  v. . v  
 (2006). 
.    i  r  tts,  
t   ill r iri  li  s l t rs t   t  l  f ll i  i  l , i  
        
si ifica t litical affe.  r ri  r, i l  t t  ,  I . . v. 1,  
. 
.   l   fr  t  l  r t ti  t  ,  l i ly  
r  l t i i t l  t  t   t'  i i    . ,  . . ,  
( ), i li ti  st t  fl  r ti  l . i  t  i i  i  , it    i  
 t  l  r t ti  t  i li t   t  rt i  it  t t  . i n,  . . , 
-  ( ). r s i  t is t   i  t i  rti l , it i  rt  ti  t t i f ti  
ist  J sti s ' r, it ,  t , ll f  i t  i  , i t  i  
2
Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 24, Iss. 2 [2008], Art. 6
https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol24/iss2/6
PRECEDENT IN THE SUPREME COURT
Some of the seeming previous unconcern for the constraints of
precedent, especially in the academic and serious non-academic
literature, is very likely a function of the Warren Court and its legacy.
Many of the Warren Court's landmark rulings, including Mapp v. Ohio,9
Baker v. Carr,'0 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,' 1 and, most famously,
Brown v. Board of Education,12 were unmistakable rejections of the
Court's earlier precedents. For those with substantive sympathy with
these and other Warren Court outcomes, it is understandable that little
time would have been spent emphasizing the virtues of stare decisis in
particular and precedential constraint in general.
But now the situation appears to be different, and there has
emerged a growing criticism of the Supreme Court for rejecting the
conclusions of the Court's previous rulings. Some of this change in
the tone of commentary about the Supreme Court seems plainly a
function of political shifts, but couching substantive criticism in the
language of judicial methodology seems dissonant, for it is not clear
that second-order procedural or methodological or institutional
constraints on preferred substantive first-order outcomes have ever
had much purchase in American constitutional or political debate.
The willingness to condemn judicial outcomes that would have been
preferred on political grounds or had been reached by the elected
branches of government was a staple of the "neutral principles91 3 and
dissent in Eichman. See also Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 435-36 (2000) (making clear
that Congress hardly hesitated in 1968 before enacting a statute intentionally designed to overrule the
Court's decision in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436,498-99 (1966)).
9. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 657-58 (1961) (holding that the exclusionary rule for illegally
obtained evidence applies in state proceedings, contrary to the Court's earlier holding in Wolf v.
Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 33 (1949)).
10. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 233 (1962) (holding reapportionment questions justiciable and
rejecting the contrary view of Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 555-56 (1946)).
11. See New York Times Co., v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 268-69 (1964) (concluding that state libel
proceedings were subject to First Amendment scrutiny, contrary to the statement in Beauharnais v.
Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 266 (1952), that the entirety of libel law was wholly outside the coverage of the
First Amendment).
12. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483,494-95 (1954) (rejecting, in the context of segregation
in public schools, the "separate but equal" doctrine of Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 551-52
(1896)).
13. See Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARv. L. REv. 1, 17
(1959).
20071
HeinOnline -- 24 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 383 2007-2008
]     383 
   f 
,  i  
  
    . io,  
  ar ,10 .  livan,11  
    cation,12 t l   
 
 l   
   
  
  
      
    
      
 l     
l   i l  ,  
r er i l  
  i    r 
   i  i  ti l    
  i l   
     
  t l i les,,13  
i t .      i   
t t s l  it t     ti     
'     , -  )). 
.  . , )   
tai e  i  li s i  t t  r i s, tr r  t  t  t'  li  l i  i  lf . 
lorado, . 
10. ee a er . rr,  . . 6,  ( 2) ( l i  r rti e t ti  j ti i l   
r j ti  t  tr r  i  f l  . ,  . . ,  i )). 
.   r  i  ., . lli ,  . . ,  4)    
r cee i s r  s j t t  irst t r ti , tr r  t  t  t t t i  mais . 
Illinois, 343 . . ,  ( ), t at t  tir t  f li l l  s ll  tsi  t  r  f t  
. 
.  r  . .  .,  . . , 494-95    
i  li  s ls, t  r t  t l  t i   l  . son,  . . ,  
)). 
.  r rt l r, r  tral i ciples /Constitutional ,  . . . ,  
). 
3
Schauer: Has Precedent Ever Really Mattered in the Supreme Court?
Published by Reading Room, 2008
GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
"legal process ' 14 perspectives of the 1950s and 1960s, and some of
this carried over to the early criticism of Roe v. Wade'5 by those who
on moral or political grounds favored what is now known as the pro-
choice position.' 6 But for thirty years or more such critiques have
been substantially more unfashionable, and for that period we have
seen a considerable amount of what might be described as the
triumph of substance over form in constitutional criticism and
constitutional theory.
Against this background of seeming unconcern for the alleged
constraints of precedent, it is tempting to explain the resurgence of
criticism of the Supreme Court for not following precedent as simply
political or ideological, with critics of the Court's substantive out-
comes resorting to precedent as simple opportunism, using whatever
norms are politically, culturally, or academically available to support
what is, in reality, a criticism of substance and not of method. And
perhaps this explanation is sound. 17 But before reaching such a
conclusion, and before too easily concluding that the critics of the
Roberts Court are being opportunistic or disingenuous, we need to
understand just what it means to follow precedent or to be con-
strained by it. Thus, it seems desirable to determine whether prece-
dent has ever been a serious constraint on or generator of Supreme
Court outcomes, and to determine whether precedential constraint-
at least in its stare decisis version and at least at the Supreme Court
level-is actually a good idea. Addressing those issues is my goal
here, for without doing so we have no hope of understanding the
14. E.g., Philip B. Kurland, Brown v. Board of Education Was the Beginning: The School
Desegregation Cases in the United States Supreme Court: 1954-1979, 1979 WASH. U. L.Q. 309 (1979).
On the Legal Process perspective generally, see HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL
PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW (William N. Eskridge, Jr. &
Philip Frickey eds., 1994).
15. SeeRoev. Wade, 410U.S. 113, 173 (1973).
16. See, most prominently, John Hart Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade,
82 YALE L.J. 920, 923, 944-45 (1973).
17. And perhaps also there is nothing wrong with taking the substantive outcomes to be expected by
one or another stance about judicial method as a reason for praising or condemning that method. See
generally Frederick Schauer, Neutrality and Judicial Review, 22 L. & PHIL. 217 (2003).
[Vol. 24:381
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PRECEDENT IN THE SUPREME COURT
recent re-emergence of a discourse about precedent that has not been
seen for generations.
I. STARE DECISIS-THE BASIC IDEA
Although the public discourse about the current Supreme Court tends
commonly to be couched in the language of "precedent," our subject is
actually stare decisis. 18 "Precedent" is the broader term, and as it is
typically used, encompasses both vertical precedent-the obligation of a
lower court to follow the rulings of a higher court in its own "chain of
command"' 9 -and horizontal precedent, the (typically non-absolute)
obligation of a court to follow its own previous decisions.2 ° Because the
latter-horizontal precedent-is what I am talking about on this occasion,
and because there is no higher court for the Supreme Court of the United
States to obey, the issue of vertical precedent can be set aside, and we can
direct our attention to the alleged constraints of stare decisis (law Latin for
"stand by the thing decided"), the obligation of a court-any court-to
follow, at least presumptively, its own previous decisions.2'
To say that a court has an obligation to follow its own previous
decisions is to say that a court has an obligation to treat the fact of a
previous decision of some question as a reason for deciding it the
same way.22 And thus it is no evidence of the recognition or existence
of such an obligation for a court to make a decision consistent with a
previous decision under circumstances in which that court or a
particular judge or Justice would have reached the same outcome
even absent the earlier decision. If I love chocolate ice cream, and if I
am ordered (by a parent, military superior, prison guard, or
18. See generally Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Stare Decisis and the Constitution: An Essay on
Constitutional Methodology, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 570 (2001); Michael J. Gerhardt, The Role of Precedent
in Constitutional Decisionmaking and Theory, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 68 (1991).
19. See Evan H. Caminker, Why Must Inferior Courts Obey Superior Court Precedents?, 46 STAN.
L. REv. 817, 841-42 (1994).
20. See Larry Alexander, Constrained by Precedent, 63 S. CAL. L. REv. 1, 19 n.22, (1989).
21. See RUPERT CROSS, PRECEDENT IN ENGLISH LAW 103-25 (3d ed. 1977); BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1443 (8th ed. 2004).
22. See Donald H. Regan, Reasons, Authority, and the Meaning of "Obey": Further Thoughts on
Raz and Obedience to Law, 3 CAN. J.L. & JURISPRUDENCE 3, 20 (1990).
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whomever) when hungry to eat chocolate ice cream, the fact that my
behavior is consistent with the content of the order is no evidence that
I am obeying the order, and is no evidence that the order is the reason
(or even a reason) for me eating the ice cream, for it is likely I would
have behaved in exactly the same way even had the order not existed.
So too with judges and precedent. In his majority opinion in Davis
v. Washington,23 Justice Scalia cited Crawford v. Washington24 in
support of the conclusion that the prosecution in a criminal case is
barred by the Confrontation Clause25 from using against a defendant
the out-of-court testimonial statements of a now-unavailable witness.
Yet it is clear from Justice Scalia's opinions in both Crawford and
Davis that he would have favored the outcome in Davis even had
Crawford not been decided, just as it is apparent that Justice
Blackmun would have opted for the same outcome in Roe v. Wade
26
even had Griswold v. Connecticu?7 not been decided eight years
earlier. Similarly, it is plain that Justice Ginsburg would have voted
to strike down the exclusion of women from the Virginia Military
Institute28 even had the Court not ruled in several previous decisions
that such explicit gender discrimination needed to be subject to
something considerably higher than the minimal scrutiny of the
rational basis standard.29 In all of these instances, and in countless
others, the Justices, just as in the example of the chocolate ice cream,
are making decisions consistent with an existing precedent, but it
would be a mistake to conclude that the Justices were following
precedent, obeying precedent, or being constrained by precedent
simply because their decisions were consistent with precedent.
23. See Davis v. Washington, 126 S. Ct. 2266, 2273 (2006).
24. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68 (2004).
25. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
26. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 166-68 (1973).
27. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
28. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 555-58 (1996).
29. See Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982) ("[T]he party seeking to uphold
a statute that classifies individuals on the basis of their gender must carry the burden of showing an
'exceedingly persuasive justification' for the classification." (quoting Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 450 U.S.
455, 461 (1981))); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (stating "[tlo withstand constitutional
challenge, previous cases establish that classifications by gender must serve important governmental
objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of those objectives").
[Vol. 24:381
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PRECEDENT IN THE SUPREME COURT
Thus, actually to follow precedent is to take a precedent's very
status-its source and not its content-as a precedent as a reason for
deciding the issue now in the same way as it had been decided in the
past. 30 Admittedly, it is true that we can have multiple reasons for our
actions, so that a decision in one way or another cannot conclusively,
by itself, tell us whether precedential constraint was a causal factor,
and, if so, just how much. Further, at times those multiple reasons
might point in the same direction, so we cannot be sure, for example,
whether Justice Ginsburg might have voted the way she did in the
VM case31 on the authority of Mississippi University for Women v.
Hogan32 and Craig v. Boren33 had she herself disagreed as a first-
order matter with what turned out to be her opinion in that case.
Nevertheless, over the course of probably more than 10,000 opinions
in certainly more than 6000 Supreme Court decisions over the last
fifty-five years (the beginning of the Warren Court era), we would
expect an appreciable number of instances in which stare decisis
actually determined an outcome if in fact stare decisis had been a
genuine causal factor in Supreme Court decision-making. So
although the existence of multiple outcome-causing reasons makes
disentangling the effect of stare decisis difficult, a reliable test of the
existence or force of a norm of precedent, given the size of the
population of Supreme Court cases, would be the frequency of
instances in which a Justice who would have decided a case in one
way held otherwise solely because of the obligation to follow
precedent. Indeed, this is plainly what the contemporary
commentators are suggesting when they chastise the current Court for
disregarding precedent. The commentators are not suggesting that
Justice Thomas should favor affirmative action, or that Justice Scalia
should have different views from the ones he now has about the
constitutionality of restrictions on abortion, or that Chief Justice
30. See generally Alexander, supra note 20; Frederick Schauer, Precedent, 39 STAN. L. REv. 571
(1987).
31. See Virginia, 518 U.S. 515.
32. See Hogan, 458 U.S. 718.
33. See Craig, 429 U.S. 190.
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Roberts and Justice Alito should suddenly discard the first-order
substantive views on important constitutional questions they held
when they were appointed to the Court.34 Rather, the precedent-based
complaint is that these and other Justices should ignore their
precedent-independent views, and instead make decisions consistent
with the Court's previous decisions even if their own inclinations and
their own analyses would have pointed them in different directions.
In the language of contemporary legal theory, the alleged
constraints of precedent and stare decisis are content-independent.35
Just like the exasperated parent who eventually says "Because I said
so!" to a questioning and recalcitrant child, an obligation to follow a
precedent comes from the very status of the precedent as a precedent.
Precedential constraint is thus independent of the putative authority-
follower's views about the content (or intrinsic persuasiveness) of the
precedent. Just as rules derive their authority from their status as rules
and not from their content, so too does a precedent derive its
precedential force from its status as a previously decided case, and
not from the power of its reasoning or the desirability of its outcome.
In the particular context of stare decisis, specifically in the context of
the Supreme Court of the United States, the claim of the Court's
current critics is that the current Justices have an obligation to follow
the Court's previous decisions regardless of the current Justices'
views about the current correctness of those decisions.
II. ON THE STRENGTH OF THE STARE DECISIS NORM
That there is, by hypothesis, an obligation of a court to follow its
own previous decisions because of their status and not because of
34. Or at least such criticism is not a part of the structure of a complaint about the failure to follow
precedent. I do not mean to suggest that those who criticize the Justices would not be tickled if the
Justices they are criticizing simply changed their first-order substantive views, but it seems plain that the
criticism of various Justices for not following precedent is a rhetorical strategy employed under
circumstances in which a change of those Justices' substantive views is highly unlikely.
35. See H. L. A. HART, Commands and Authoritative Legal Reasons, in ESSAYS ON BENTHAM:
STUDIES IN JURISPRUDENCE AND POLITICAL THEORY 243, 261-66 (1982); Frederick Schauer, The
Questions ofAuthority, 81 GEO. L.J. 95, 96 n.6 (1992).
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their content does not mean that the obligation is absolute. Just as the
requirements of Equal Protection and Due Process may be overcome
by a governmental showing of a compelling state interest,36 and just
as Justice Holmes described the constraints of the First Amendment
as being overridable in cases of "clear and present danger," 37 so too is
it possible that on occasion the obligations of stare decisis might be
overcome without such occasions indicating that there is or was no
continuing obligation to follow earlier decisions. When the Supreme
Court finds that there exists a governmental interest sufficiently
compelling to override the requirement of the Equal Protection
clause, 8 and when the Court agrees that a compelling interest allows
an override of what otherwise would have been the requirements of
the First Amendment, 39 the equal protection and First Amendment
requirements do not disappear. Nor did they disappear even in the
very cases in which the compelling interest arose. Similarly, the
requirements of stare decisis do not disappear, either for the future or
in that case, when they are overridden by particularly powerful
reasons for not following a previous decision.
As with the compelling interest and clear and present danger
standards, however, an overridable obligation can be considered an
obligation only if the threshold for override is higher than the
threshold would have been for a decision of that type absent the
obligation. Were there no rule of stare decisis, a court would
presumably have the freedom to reject any earlier decision it thought
mistaken. Consequently, if a court under a purported regime of stare
36. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 165-66 (1973) (holding a state may place "restrictions on
abortion ... so long as those restrictions are tailored to the recognized state interests ... [and] provide
compelling justifications for intervention."); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 638 (1969) (stating a
restriction of a fundamental right "must be judged by the stricter standard of whether it promotes a
compelling state interest."), overruled on other grounds in part by Fed. Election Comm'n v. Wisconsin
Right to Life, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2652 (2007); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
37. See Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) (stating the freedom of speech would not
cover such speech that "create[s] a clear and present danger" to cause the "substantive evils that
Congress has a right to prevent.").
38. See cases cited supra note 36.
39. See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 774 (1982) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (stating that
"compelling interests" may allow "New York to ban knowing distribution of works depicting minors
engaged in explicit sexual conduct," notwithstanding the value that society may place on the works).
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decisis is free to disregard any previous decisions it believes wrong,
then the standard for disregarding is the same when stare decisis
applies as when it does not, and the alleged stare decisis norm turns
out to be doing no work. If this is so, then stare decisis does not in
fact exist as a norm at all. But if, by contrast, it requires a better
reason to disregard a mistaken precedent than merely that it is
believed mistaken, a stare decisis norm can be said to exist even if it
is overridable. In such a case, however, it would be necessary for the
standard for override to be higher than the standard for reaching the
same outcome absent the precedent. This might be expressed in terms
of a belief that the previous decision is extremely or really really
really wrong, or wrong and extremely harmful, or something of that
variety but, for a norm of stare decisis in fact to exist in a meaningful
way, there must be a gap between what the standard for rejecting a
previous decision would have been without the norm of stare decisis
and what that standard is with a norm of stare decisis. And this gap or
heightened justification is what the Supreme Court plainly had in
mind when it said that it needed a "special justification ' 4° in order to
disregard an earlier decision, although the question whether the Court
meant what it said, or has acted consistently with what it said,
remains to be answered.
Thus, it is a not a necessary consequence of the existence of a
norm of stare decisis that earlier decisions never be overruled. That
Brown v. Board of Education4 1 overruled Plessy v. Ferguson42 does
not show that stare decisis on the Supreme Court is non-existent. It
shows only that if there is a norm of stare decisis, then, unlike British
practice prior to 1965, it is a non-absolute norm.43 But for a norm to
be non-absolute and still operate as a potentially decision-influencing
40. Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 443 (2000); Arizona v. Rumsey, 467 U.S. 203, 212
(1984).
41. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 492-95 (1954) (overruling Plessy v. Ferguson after
considering public education and "its present place in the American life throughout the Nation.").
42. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
43. Prior to the Practice Statement on Judicial Precedent of 1966, even the highest courts in Great
Britain were not permitted to overrule their own previous decisions, such an act being deemed law-
making, and thus reserved for Parliament. See generally CROSS, supra note 21.
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norm, it must entail some modification of the otherwise applicable
decision-making structure because of that norm, and that is why, in
this context, I describe this modification as a higher threshold for
disregarding a previous decision than would have existed without the
stare decisis norm. It is a highly likely, but not logically necessary,
empirical consequence of the existence of a stare decisis norm, that
there will exist at least some decisions that are followed because of
the norm that would not otherwise be followed, and that some wrong
but not extremely wrong decisions remain on the books, or attract
agreement from those who would have decided them differently. If in
fact the "special justification" standard is illusory, and if in fact the
Justices never or almost never follow an earlier decision with which
they disagree, then it is hard to conclude that even a non-absolute
norm of stare decisis actually exists.44 In theory, stare decisis could
exist even though it never prevailed, for it might exist as a norm that
in every case either produced the same result as would have been
produced without it or was overridden by compelling reasons.
III. Is THERE A NoRM OF STARE DECISIS?
All of this is by way of attempting to explain what a norm45 of
stare decisis would look like were one to exist in and for the Supreme
Court of the United States. But as we know from the example of
unicorns, it is one thing to explain what something would look like if
it were to exist and another to determine whether it in fact exists or
not. So although we now have a pretty good idea of what a norm of
stare decisis would look like and how it would operate were it to
exist, we do not yet know whether it really does exist, or, like
unicorns, has a conceptual but not a real existence. Consequently, the
question now before us is whether a norm of stare decisis does indeed
44. As should by now be clear, I use "exists" in this context solely to refer to some norm being
accepted and employed by some group of decision-makers in some decision-making domain. Existence
is thus for my present purposes a purely sociologically descriptive notion, unrelated to questions of
moral epistemology or normative political theory.
45. 1 use the term "norm" here to refer to an existing practice taken to be desirable, the departure
from which is thus grounds for criticism.
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exist. The contemporary critics of the Roberts Court assume that a
norm of stare decisis exists, because otherwise the criticism of the
Court for not following it would make no sense. But is there such a
norm? What is the norm that the Roberts Court is in fact
disregarding, where does it come from, and has it existed in the past?
A considerable number of political scientists have looked at
precisely this question, and the existing research provides very strong
support for the view that, at least in the Supreme Court, there exists
no strong norm of stare decisis.46 This reference to a "norm" is my
language and not that of the political scientists, but the import of the
political science research lies in its supporting the conclusion that
among the factors that determine Supreme Court outcomes, previous
decisions are rarely among them.47 The Justices of course do provide
numerous allegedly supporting citations to previous Supreme Court
decisions, but the principal conclusion of the empirical research is
that the data do not support the traditional picture about the
importance of precedent in the Supreme Court.48 Rather, it appears
that the Court's previous decisions only rarely and weakly influence
current results. Instead of being causal of Supreme Court outcomes,
the Court's prior decisions appear to provide, consistent with the
46. See Jeffrey A. Segal & Harold J. Spaeth, The Influence of Stare Decisis on the Votes of Supreme
Court Justices, 40 AM. J. POL. SCI. 971, 973, 983-84 (1996). See generally LAWRENCE BAUM, THE
PUZZLE OF JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR (1997); SAUL BRENNER & HAROLD J. SPAETH, STARE INDECISIS: THE
ALTERATION OF PRECEDENT ON THE SUPREME COURT, 1946-1992 (1995); JEFFREY A. SEGAL &
HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATrITUDINAL MODEL (1993); JEFFREY A. SEGAL &
HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED (2002); HAROLD
J. SPAETH & JEFFREY A. SEGAL, MAJORITY RULE OR MINORITY WILL: ADHERENCE TO PRECEDENT ON
THE U.S. SUPREME COURT (2001); James H. Fowler & Sangick Jeon, The Authority of Supreme Court
Precedent, 30 SOC. NETWORKS 16 (2008). Somewhat more qualified views can be found in LEE
EPSTEIN & JOSEPH F. KOBYLKA, THE SUPREME COURT AND LEGAL CHANGE: ABORTION AND THE
DEATH PENALTY 5-7 (1992); THOMAS G. HANSFORD & JAMES F. SPRIGGS 11, THE POLITICS OF
PRECEDENT ON THE U.S. SUPREME COURT 3-12 (2006); Paul J. Wahlbeck, The Life of the Law: Judicial
Politics andLegal Change, 59 J. POL. 778, 792-96 (1997).
47. Although not directly relevant here, it is worth noting that under Segal and Spaeth's "attitudinal"
model, ideology, broadly speaking-substantive policy views-is the single greatest determinant of the
votes of the Justices. See generally JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND
THE ATITUDINAL MODEL (1993).
48. See generally Anthony Lewis, Foreword to THE BURGER COURT: THE COUNTER-REVOLUTION
THAT WASN'T vii, vii-viii (Vincent Blasi ed., 1983).
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standard Legal Realist picture of the effect of precedent in general,49
primarily ex post justifications and rationalizations for decisions that
have actually been reached on grounds other than precedent.
The empirical research does not support the conclusion, nor does it
claim, that individual Justices never take the Court's previous rulings
as authoritative, but the research is most consistent with the
proposition that the cases in which the Justices actually follow
precedent are rare, and the cases in which following precedent is
dispositive are rarer still. So as should be clear by now, the set of
cases or opinions that display genuine constraint by stare decisis will
not include those in which a Justice cites an earlier decision to
support what he or she should or would, even absent the previous
case, likely have concluded even absent the earlier decision. If we
eliminate these cases and opinions in which the citation of earlier
cases is largely redundant, we find ourselves now searching for
instances in which a Justice voted contrary to his or her precedent-
independent beliefs solely because of the current felt obligation to
follow precedent. Such instances do exist, but it turns out that they
are few and far between. Justice Stewart had dissented in Griswold v.
Connecticut, insisting that the Constitution contained no "general
right of privacy," 50 but joined the majority in Roe v. Wade because of
what to him was the controlling force of a case with which he had
disagreed. 51 In several criminal procedure cases of the 1950s and
1960s, Justice Harlan voted to apply earlier decisions in which he had
been a dissenter, 52 and Justice White did the same thing when,
despite his strong dissent in Miranda v. Arizona53 in 1966, he voted
49. There are numerous versions of Legal Realism, of course, but a common theme of much of Legal
Realism is that the stated reasons for a decision are rarely the genuine reasons, as opposed to the after-
the-fact justifications for decisions reached on other and unstated grounds. See JEROME FRANK, LAW
AND THE MODERN MIND (1930). See generally WILFRID E. RUMBLE, JR., AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM:
SKEPTICISM, REFORM, AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1968); WILLIAM TWINING, KARL LLEWELLYN AND
THE REALIST MOVEMENT (1973).
50. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 530 (1965) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
51. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 168, 170 (1973) (Stewart, J., concurring).
52. See Henry J. Bourguignon, The Second Mr. Justice Harlan: His Principles of Judicial Decision
Making, 1979 SUP. CT. REV. 251, 279.
53. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 504 (1966).
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in 1980 in Edwards v. Arizona to extend Miranda's ban on police
questioning after a suspect had invoked his Miranda rights. Similarly,
Justice Scalia has been willing, on stare decisis grounds, to apply the
dormant commerce clause to invalidate explicitly protectionist
legislation, even though he himself believes the so-called dormant
commerce clause has no basis in the text or history of the
Constitution.54 And in Ring v. Arizona,55 a case applying Apprendi v.
New Jersey,56 Justice Kennedy, in a concurring opinion, thought it
important to note that "[t]hough it is still my view that Apprendi v.
New Jersey ... was wrongly decided, Apprendi is now the law, and
its holding must be implemented in a principled way.",
57
There are undoubtedly other examples, to be sure, but it is
interesting that this brief list may well constitute a quite large
percentage, at least for the fifty-five years from the beginning of the
Warren Court era, of the entirety of such cases. When requested to
think of cases in which a Supreme Court Justice who had voted one
way on an issue, or was known to have certain first-order views about
some constitutional issue, subsequently voted the other way because
of the obligation to follow a precedent with which he or she had
disagreed, numerous colleagues at multiple institutions were
unanimous in concluding that there were very few. Indeed, the
foregoing list is pretty much all that these various colleagues could
think of, at least in terms of providing crisp and unambiguous
examples in which a Justice known from his or her opinions or extra-
judicial writings to believe one proposition or conclusion had voted
contrary to those beliefs because of the felt obligation to follow an
earlier decision of the Court.
58
54. See W. Lynn Creamery v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 209-10 (1994) (Scalia, J., concurring); see also
Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 610 (1997) (Thomas, J., joined by
Scalia, J., dissenting); New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 273-74 (1988).
55. Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 613 (2002).
56. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
57. Ring, 536 U.S. at 613 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
58. I do not claim that asking one's friends or colleagues is a reliable research method, but it is
difficult to prove a negative, and thus an otherwise lazy (but nevertheless common) research approach
occasionally has its advantages.
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That such instances of genuine stare decisis influence are so rare is
underscored by the ubiquity of the opposite phenomenon. Supreme
Court Justices whose views have been rejected by a majority of their
colleagues overwhelmingly continue to adhere to those outvoted
views in subsequent cases-the phenomenon of persistent dissent-
thus in effect rejecting the idea of stare decisis and rejecting the
constraints of precedent. 59 Consider, for example, the opinions of
Justices Brennan and Marshall in obscenity cases subsequent to the
landmark 1973 decisions in Miller v. California60 and Paris Adult
Theatre I v. Slaton.6 1 In Miller and Paris Adult Theatre, Justice
Brennan, himself the author in Roth v. United States62 of the Supreme
Court's "non-speech" approach allowing the regulation of legally
defined obscenity in the face of First Amendment objections,
dissented, concluding that the approach he had earlier created had
proved unworkable in practice and created constitutionally
impermissible vagueness problems with a consequent chilling effect
on constitutionally protected material.63
Justice Brennan's dissenting position in the 1973 obscenity cases is
a plausible one-indeed, it may even be right-but it did not
command a majority of the Court. Yet for Justice Brennan, the
Court's majority opinions in these cases did not compel him to follow
them, and he continued to dissent in any subsequent obscenity case in
which an obscenity law or a conviction under it was upheld.64 And,
indeed, Justice Brennan had, to his credit, written thoughtfully and
forcefully in justification of his own practice of persistent dissent.65
59. See generally Earl M. Maltz, Some Thoughts on the Death of Stare Decisis in Constitutional
Law, 1980 WIs. L. REv. 467. For an earlier plea that Supreme Court Justices engage unashamedly in just
this practice, see generally William 0. Douglas, Stare Decisis, 49 COLUM. L. REv. 735 (1949). See also
Justice Reed's opinion in Smith v. Allright, 321 U.S. 649,665 (1944).
60. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
61. Paris Adult Theater I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973).
62. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 469 (1957).
63. Paris Adult Theatre 1, 413 U.S. at 73-74, 91 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
64. See, e.g., Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497, 506-07 (1987); Smith v. United States, 431 U.S. 291,
311 (1977); Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 142 (1974). And this list of cases excludes a far
more substantial number of dissents from denials of certiorari in which the Court refused to review
obscenity convictions.
65. William J. Brennan, Jr., In Defense ofDissents, 37 HASTINGS L.J. 427, 427, 436-37 (1986).
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I use this example precisely because it is so crisp. The
constitutional rule-legally defined obscenity is outside of the
coverage of the First Amendment-to which Justice Brennan refused
to give stare decisis effect, was just the one he himself had created
sixteen years earlier in Roth, and which he subsequently rejected in
Miller for reasons of practical unworkability rather than fundamental
theoretical error. And although reasonable minds can differ on this
question, the written, printed, and photographic materials at issue in
these cases, the materials in defense of which Justice Brennan refused
to apply the principle of stare decisis, could hardly be thought of as
lying at the center of free speech values.
66
I do not want to single out Justice Brennan unfairly. His behavior
-which to his credit he was willing to explain and justify-was
entirely consistent with that of almost all of his colleagues almost all
of the time. That same behavior of persisting in dissent is seen in
many dissenting Justices, who continue to adhere to their dissents,
and do not take -supposed norms of stare decisis notwithstanding-
a majority decision of the Court to have reason-giving or decision-
guiding effect.67 If one looks at actual Supreme Court practice,
therefore, one is forced to conclude that there is hardly any existing
norm of stare decisis on the Supreme Court. This conclusion is based
not on any single form of research, and each of these forms has its
undeniable flaws. My conclusion, however, is based on the
confluence of the empirical research by political scientists, the
paucity of crisp examples of outcome-changing precedential effect
for individual Justices, the phenomenon of persistent dissent, and the
66. And in this respect these cases differ from the death penalty cases, in which Justices Brennan and
Marshall were also persistent dissenters, but in which the very consequences of death make it maximally
plausible for a dissenter from the death penalty to adhere to that dissenting position. See generally
Michael Mello, Adhering to Our Views: Justices Brennan and Marshall and the Relentless Dissent to
Death as a Punishment, 22 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 592 (1995); Laura K. May, Justice Brennan and the
Jurisprudence of Dissent, 61 TEMP. L. REV. 307 (1988).
67. See generally Maurice Kelman, The Forked Path of Dissent, 1985 Sup. CT. REV. 227; Earl M.
Maltz, No Rules in a Knife Fight: Chief Justice Rehnquist and the Doctrine of Stare Decisis, 25
RUTGERS L.J. 669 (1994); Henry Paul Monaghan, Stare Decisis and Constitutional Adjudication, 88
COLUM. L. REV. 723 (1988); Henry P. Monaghan, Taking Supreme Court Opinions Seriously, 39 MD. L.
REV. 1 (1979).
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explicit rejection of the stare decisis norm by Justices such as Justice
Scalia. With all of these mutually-reinforcing sources of data pointing
in the same direction, it is hard to resist the conclusion that the norm
the current Court is commonly accused of rejecting is one that
appears now not to exist and that appears not to have existed for at
least several generations.
IV. ON THE VALUE OF STARE DECISIS
That there has been for more than fifty years scarcely any extant
stare decisis norm in the Supreme Court68-very little felt obligation to
follow precedent just because it is precedent and not because the
precedent is believed to be correct-is hardly an oversight. Justice
Scalia has been most explicit in explaining his refusal to accept such a
norm,69 arguing that his oath requires him to interpret and obey the
Constitution and not others' views about the Constitution. He has thus
consistently argued that he was appointed by the President and
confirmed by the Senate to give his views, and not the views of his
predecessors. This position is a bit question-begging because the view
that a Justice is expected to express his or her own views is not
inconsistent with the position that one's own views can incorporate
one's own views about deference to the views of others or deference to
earlier decisions. Contrary to Justice Scalia's conclusion, the view that
the oath of office requires following the Constitution is open to the
interpretation that stare decisis is sufficiently part of the Constitution
itself, or that a judicial method incorporating stare decisis is
sufficiently part of the Constitution itself (and was in 1789 when
Article III was adopted), that rejection of stare decisis is not required
by the oath of office. Still, Justice Scalia's point is plain enough, and
underscores the fact that a norm of stare decisis is, in important
respects, counter-intuitive. It is hardly self-evident that requiring a
68. See James H. Fowler & Sangick Jeon, The Authority of Supreme Court Precedent, 30 Soc.
NETWORKS 16 (2008).
69. See, e.g., South Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805, 825 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 993 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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judge to suppress his or her own best all-things-considered judgment to
the dead hand of the past or to the (from his or her perspective)
erroneous views of one's historical colleagues is sensible. And it is
likely to appear particularly non-sensible to the judge at precisely the
moment when following the stare decisis norm will direct that judge to
make what he or she believes to be wrong decision.
There are, of course, arguments going the other way, arguments
that make stare decisis appear less counter-intuitive. Thus, a norm of
stare decisis might be defended on any of several different grounds.
70
Most common would be one or another variety of the position that
law is the special steward of stability for stability's sake, consistency
for consistency's sake, and settlement for settlement's sake; a
position most famously expressed by Justice Brandeis in Burnet v.
Coronado Oil & Gas Co. 71 where Brandeis memorably stated that "in
most matters it is more important that the applicable rule of law be
settled than that it be settled right.,
72
As the clash of opinions in Payne v. Tennessee73 made clear some
years ago, it is not self-evident that Justice Brandeis's position in
Coronado Oil is as attractive outside the realm of commercial and
related issues as within. Nor is it self-evident that on issues involving
70. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 845-46 (applying the doctrine of stare decisis where a prior decision was
still workable and its basis had not changed); Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827-28 (1991) (stating
stare decisis is "not an inexorable command" and overturning precedent is proper "when governing
decisions are unworkable or are badly reasoned"); Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 172
(1989) (holding stare decisis has "special force in the area of statutory interpretation ... [where]
Congress remains free to alter what we have done."); Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, Inc., 462
U.S. 416, 420 (1983) (reaffirming Roe v. Wade and stating "stare decisis, while perhaps never entirely
persuasive on a constitutional question, is a doctrine that demands respect in a society governed by the
rule of law.").
71. Bumet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
72. Id.
73. Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 829-30, 850, 859 (1991) (overruling its prior decisions in
Booth v. Maryland and South Carolina v. Gathers and holding that evidence relating to a murder victim
and the impact on the victim's family was admissible at a capital sentencing hearing); id. at 842-43
(Souter, J., concurring) (finding precedent in the Court's stare decisis that decisions "wrongly decided,
unworkable ... call[] for some further action by the Court... not to compound the original error, but to
overrule the precedent."); id. at 848 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (stating the "overruling of one of this
Court's precedents ought to be a matter of great moment and consequence."); id. at 859 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (claiming the "majority has obviously been moved by an argument that has strong political
appeal but no proper place in a reasoned judicial opinion.").
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morally or politically important individual rights that we can or
should expect Supreme Court Justices to suppress their own best
moral, political, and constitutional judgment to the values of stability,
notice, reliance, or simply being consistent with the past. But
regardless of whether in the final analysis that position-that stare
decisis has little place in the Supreme Court-is correct or not, it is
quite plain that it is the position that has prevailed on the Supreme
Court at least since the days of Chief Justice Earl Warren, and in all
likelihood for some time before that as well.
A LIMITED CONCLUSION
My conclusion that precedent has rarely genuinely mattered in the
Supreme Court, as opposed to being a causally inert makeweight
phrase, and as opposed to largely causally inert citations to previous
decisions, should not be taken as a claim about courts in general, or
about stare decisis in general, or about precedent in general. Because
the Supreme Court's docket is dominated by cases of exceptionally
high moral, political, and policy consequence, the Supreme Court
may actually be the last place to look to find actual traces of stare
decisis. If we are searching for stare decisis, it is likely far more
fruitful to look at the mine run of less momentous cases in the state
courts and in the lower federal courts, for that is where a larger
percentage of the docket is comprised of more routine cases
involving neither individual rights nor fundamental questions of
governmental structure, and thus where the values of consistency for
consistency's sake may be seen to be comparatively more important.
In addition, the Supreme Court's control of its own docket and its
very limited number of cases-only seventy-three decided with full
arguments and opinions out of almost 9000 petitions in the 2006
Term74 -is such that very few cases truly presenting stare decisis
opportunities will be part of the Court's business at all. Cases simply
74. To be exact, the Court in the 2006 Term was asked to decide 8902 cases, of which it decided 278
summarily without opinion and seventy-three with full signed opinions. The Supreme Court, 2005
Term--The Statistics, 121 HARV. L. REv. 436 (2006).
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raising the same questions as earlier will not be heard at all, and thus
the set of cases that actually are heard is a set in which it will be
extremely rare for there to be cases presenting the exact same
question as one that had been presented at some earlier time. The
Supreme Court's output of cases decided by full opinion after
briefing and argument is highly unrepresentative of law generally and
even of constitutional law particularly. Instead, the Court's output of
decisions is an output consisting almost entirely of cases that found
their way onto the pinnacle of American adjudication precisely
because there was no law or because the law was virtually in
equipoise between the opposing positions. 75 As a result, the cases in
this small and unrepresentative set are those, especially given the
confluence of high political and moral stakes with the constitutional
or legal indeterminacy of these cases, in which the constraints of law,
including but not limited to the constraints of a norm of stare decisis,
are at a low ebb.76
Although it would therefore be an error to generalize from the
Supreme Court's longstanding and substantial neglect of the
precedential effect of its own previous decisions to a conclusion
about the existing practices of courts and judges in general, the
Supreme Court not only has a special visibility, it has a special
visibility as a court. Whether the Supreme Court's docket is actually
representative of law generally or the business of courts generally is a
different question from whether significant numbers of people might
not see the Court and its work as more representative than it is, and
thus infer, even if erroneously, that the Supreme Court is more
similar to other courts than it is different. Consequently, the Supreme
Court, even if unwittingly, likely serves as an exemplar for the
75. See Frederick Schauer, Judging in a Corner of the Law, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1717, 1727-28
(1988).
76. I also make no claim here that stare decisis plays no role in the Court's decisions about which
cases to take. It seems plausible that stare decisis is a much larger factor in the decision to deny
certiorari than it is for the decision of the cases for which certiorari is granted. But it is also plausible
that, knowing of the weakness of the stare decisis norm for cases subject to full briefing and argument,
Justices will rarely vote against certiorari solely on stare decisis grounds. As between these two
competing hypotheses, my hunch is that the latter is more likely true, but I offer this as nothing more
than an unsupported hunch.
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political branches and for the larger public of what courts do and
what methods of reasoning they employ in doing it.
The evidence indicates that the Supreme Court's current critics are
mistaken in claiming the Roberts Court is in some way taking stare
decisis less seriously than did its predecessors on the Warren, Burger,
and Rehnquist Courts.7 7 That is not to say it might not be desirable
not only for the Roberts Court but also for the Supreme Court of the
future to take stare decisis more seriously than has been the case for a
long time, and thus to value stability, consistency, settlement,
reliance, notice, and predictability more than do other governmental
decision-making bodies. Even if the critics are criticizing the Court
from the perch of a largely non-existent norm, the current period, one
in which the Court and its role are undergoing a substantial
transformation in the public's eye, may nevertheless prove to be an
opportune moment for the Court's longstanding and arguably
troubling disregard for precedent to be subjected to some entirely
appropriate, long needed, and hopefully less ideologically or
politically motivated, critical commentary.
77. At times the claim of ignoring precedent makes the additional mistake of claiming that the
Roberts Court is ignoring the precedents that the critic happens to prefer without acknowledging
precedents going in the opposite direction. Ronald Dworkin, for example, in Dworkin, supra note 2,
chastises the Court in Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618 (2007), for ignoring the holding in Tinker v.
Des Moines Indep. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 514 (1969), in ruling against the student speaker in a public
school free speech case. Dworkin is correct that the result in Frederick is in some tension with the result
in Tinker, but the opposite result in Frederick would have been in just as much tension with the more
recent Hazelwood School Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 276 (1988) (holding a principal's decision
that the "need to protect the privacy of individuals... within [a] school community" did not violate the
First Amendment), and Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 685 (1986) (holding school
officials may determine that "to permit a vulgar and lewd speech.., would undermine the school's basic
educational mission" and thus does not violate First Amendment rights), neither of which Dworkin
mentions. Plausible arguments can be made that it would have been better in Frederick to follow Tinker,
thus treating the Hazelwood and Bethel precedents more casually. But given the array of conflicting
precedents, criticizing the Frederick majority for ignoring precedent, as such, seems considerably more
than the evidence can sustain.
20071
HeinOnline -- 24 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 401 2007-2008
)  E  401 
l    
      
 '  t  
 i    
  
t 7   
t     
f t r  t  t  t  i i   i l  t    t     
 ,  
, ilit  t l 
i  i   
     
i  i  t  rt  it  l   i   t ti l 
ti      
  '   l  
   l  
i t , ll   
,  
. t ti  t  l i   i ri  t  t  iti l   i   
rt  t i  i i  t  t     s  t ing 
r ts i  i  t  it  ir ti . l  r i , f r l , i  i ,  t  , 
ti  t  rt i   . rick,  . t.  ,      . 
 i  . . i t.,  . . ,  9),    r  
l   .   t t erick i  lt 
i  i ker, t t e site res lt i  re erick l    i  j t   t i  it  t  r  
r t l  l i t. . l eier,  . . ,  8)  '   
t t t  "  t  r t t t  ri  f i i iduals . it i  [ ] l it  i  t i l t   
irst e e t), a  t l . ist. .  . ser,  . . ,  ( 6) ( l i  l 
ffi i ls  t nni e t t t  nnit     eech . nn '  
ti l i i   t   t i l t  i t t i t , it    
ti . l i l  r ts    t t it l      rick er, 
t  tr ti  t  l    ts     
r t , riti i i  t  erick j it   i i  t,  ,  
t  t  i   t i . 
21
Schauer: Has Precedent Ever Really Mattered in the Supreme Court?
Published by Reading Room, 2008
HeinOnline -- 24 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 402 2007-2008
22
Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 24, Iss. 2 [2008], Art. 6
https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol24/iss2/6
